Jargon alert : Monopoly by Aaron Steelman
E
conomic terms don’t often find their way into everyday
parlance. There are a few exceptions, though. Consider
the term “monopoly.” In a debate, for instance, you
might hear one person tell the other that “no one has a monop-
oly on the truth.” What the person means is that there isn’t just
one side to an issue — there are two or maybe even more.
In economics, the term “monopoly” is used in a similar
way. When there is only one seller of a good or service, that
company is dubbed a monopoly. 
Economists object to monopolies because they can 
lower social welfare. The reason is that the monopolist can
raise the price of its good or service above the 
competitive level, to a point where consumers demand less 
of the product than they would otherwise. 
Consider the case of a monopolist widget
maker. He can produce widgets at a con-
stant cost of $2 per unit. If he charges $3
for the good, he can sell 600 units, while if
he charges $4, he can sell only 400. You
might initially think that he would choose
to charge $3 so that he could sell more
widgets. But charging $4 is actually more
profitable. Under that scenario, he makes a
profit of $800 (400 x $2). At $3 per widget,
his profit is just $600 (600 x $1). From the
point of view of the widget maker, produc-
ing fewer widgets is the rational thing to
do. But society is made worse off. If the
market were competitive, more widgets
would be produced and consumed.
Similar problems can arise in the case
of an “oligopoly.” This is when a market is 
dominated by a small number of firms. If
those firms decide to coordinate their actions
and raise prices above a competitive rate — thus forming a 
“cartel” — the oligopolists in effect act like monopolists. 
How common are monopolies and oligopolies in the real
world? And do they typically lower social welfare in the 
way described above?
Some industries have been dominated by only a few firms.
Take the auto industry, for example. From the 1950s through
the mid-1970s, the “Big Three” automakers — General
Motors, Ford, and Chrysler — dominated the U.S. auto mar-
ket. During that period, they regularly produced about 90
percent of all vehicles purchased domestically. Now, however,
that figure is down to about 58 percent. 
Many Americans were unhappy with the choices offered
by Detroit, and turned instead to cars from foreign auto-
makers. Ultimately, competition from abroad forced the
American companies to improve their products — to the
benefit of everyone. This is the case of an oligopoly collaps-
ing, as consumer sentiment shifted and barriers to entry —
such as import restrictions — became less burdensome.
But what if an oligopoly doesn’t collapse? How dangerous
is it? The late George Stigler, whose work on industrial organ-
ization won him the Nobel Prize in economics in 1982, long
favored antitrust laws aimed to break up oligopolies, but over
time lost his “enthusiasm for antitrust policy and much of 
our fear of oligopolies.” 
Antitrust laws, Stigler believed, were actually being used 
by some companies to prevent competition rather than to
increase it. And in other cases, they were a barrier to poten-
tially useful mergers.
In addition, empirical analysis led 
Stigler to believe that oligopolies often
were unable to earn returns much 
above what we would expect in a com-
petitive market. “The relationship
between profitability and concentration
is almost invariably loose: less than 
25 percent of the variation in profit 
rates across industries can be attributed
to concentration,” Stigler wrote.
Why might this be the case? There 
are several possibilities. One is that 
cartels are inherently unstable. A small
number of firms may collude to raise
prices. But there is always an incentive
for one of those firms to defect, lower its
price, and gain the lion’s share of the 
market for itself. Another reason is that
the mere threat of a startup company 
entering the market and taking business
away from existing companies can exert discipline on
monopolists and oligopolists, making them behave as if com-
petition were brisk.  
Some monopolists and oligopolists, however, enjoy 
government protections that shield them from such compe-
tition. The taxi industry is one example. In many cities, the
number of cabs in operation is tightly controlled by local 
officials. The U.S. Postal Service is another. Companies like
FedEx can compete on the shipment of packages, but with 
a few exceptions cannot deliver letters.
In theory, it’s easy to see why monopolies and oligopolies
could be socially undesirable. In practice, though, the 
evidence is not so clear, and the actions used to prevent
industries from becoming concentrated sometimes can 
produce effects worse than the problem itself.   RF
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